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ADDRESSING THE HARM OF TOTAL SURVEILLANCE: A
REPLY TO PROFESSOR NEIL RICHARDS

Danielle Keats Citron ∗ and David Gray ∗∗
The ethos of our age is “the more data, the better.” 1 In nearly
every sector of our society, information technologies identify, track,
analyze, and classify individuals by collecting and aggregating data.
Law enforcement, agencies, industry, employers, hospitals, transportation providers, Silicon Valley, and individuals are all engaged in the
pervasive collection and analysis of data that ranges from the mundane to the deeply personal. 2 Rather than being silos, these data gathering and surveillance systems are linked, shared, and integrated.
Whether referred to as coveillance, 3 sousveillance, 4 bureaucratic surveillance, 5 “surveillance-industrial complex,” 6 “panvasive searches,” 7
or business intelligence, total-information awareness is the objective. 8

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
∗ Lois K. Macht Research Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law; Affiliate
Scholar, Stanford Center on Internet and Society; Affiliate Fellow, Yale Information Society
Project.
∗∗ Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. We are grateful to Neil
Richards for his thoughtful essay and feedback and to Julie Cohen, Leslie Henry, Amanda
Pustilnik, Daniel Solove, and the participants in the Harvard Law Review Symposium on Privacy
and Technology for their helpful suggestions.
1 Kelley Stone, Deploying and Operating an Effective Regional Fusion Center: Lessons
Learned from the North Central Texas Fusion System 6 (July 19, 2007) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
2 See, e.g., Charles Duhigg, Psst, You in Aisle 5, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2012, at MM30.
3 JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF 144–48 (2012).
4 Steve Mann et al., Sousveillance: Inventing and Using Wearable Computing Devices for
Data Collection in Surveillance Environments, 1 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 331 (2003)
(describing personalized computer devices recording users’ activities).
5 JOHN GILLIOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE, RESISTANCE, AND THE
LIMITS OF PRIVACY 18, 119 (2001) (exploring surveillance of the poor to administer public
benefits).
6 JAY STANLEY, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE SURVEILLANCE-INDUSTRIAL
COMPLEX: HOW THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT IS CONSCRIPTING BUSINESSES AND
INDIVIDUALS IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF A SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY (2004), available at
http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/surveillance_report.pdf (documenting industry’s partnership with
government to engage in monitoring of citizens).
7 Christopher Slobogin, Rehnquist and Panvasive Surveillance, 82 MISS. L.J. 307 (2013).
8 See Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 11053, § 511, 121 Stat. 266, 317. See generally INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE (INCLUDING
TERRORISM) FUSION CENTERS 5 (Todd Masse et al. eds., 2008).
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Consider Virtual Alabama. 9 Google has built a customized database for Alabama’s Department of Homeland Security that combines
three-dimensional satellite/aerial imagery of the state with geospatial
analytics that reveal relationships, trends, and patterns in incoming
data. 10 Virtual Alabama can “track moving objects, monitor sensors,
and overlay near-real time data sets.” 11 Alabama will continue to add
inputs, 12 but the system already aggregates data from traffic cameras,
real-time private and public video streams, GPS location data for police cruisers, building schematics, sex offenders’ addresses, and landownership records. 13 The state’s 1500 public schools plan to link their
video cameras into the system, providing live streaming 24 hours a
day, 7 days a week. 14 Virtual Alabama is also encouraging contributions from government agencies in exchange for access to the system. 15
The stated goal of the program is to map all available data in the
state. 16
Virtual Alabama is part of a broader surveillance system sponsored
by federal, state, and local governments and their private partners. In
the wake of the 9/11 attacks, Congress adopted a number of innovations to break down ossified bureaucratic structures that previously
impeded intelligence efforts to identify future threats. Among these
innovations was the creation of the new Department of Homeland Security. 17 Amidst these efforts, the United States rejected proposals to
establish an intelligence agency akin to Britain’s MI5, which is devoted to domestic intelligence and surveillance, due to bureaucratic in-

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
9 See TORIN MONAHAN, SURVEILLANCE IN THE TIME OF INSECURITY 47 (2010);
Google Earth Enterprise Case Study: Virtual Alabama, YOUTUBE (Sep. 24, 2008), http://www
.youtube.com/watch?v=a-1I0JTWiIY.
10 MONAHAN, supra note 9, at 46–49.
11 2008 Innovation Awards Program Application, COUNCIL ST. GOV’TS 1, http://ssl.csg.org
/innovations/2008/2008Southapplications/08S05alvirtualalabama.pdf (last visited May 14, 2013).
12 Id. at 3.
13 Corey McKenna, Virtual Alabama Facilitates Data Sharing Among State and Local
Agencies, DIGITAL COMMUNITIES (Aug. 13, 2009), http://www.digitalcommunities.com/articles
/virtual-alabama-facilitates-data-sharing-among.html.
14 Lamar Davis & Jacob Cook, Virtual Alabama School Safety System, http://rems.ed.gov/docs
/fy10rems_fgm_nhmd_virtualalabama.pdf (last visited May 14, 2013). Some states require public
school students to carry Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) cards that track their
whereabouts.
“Smart” Student ID Cards: Student Locator Pilot, NORTHSIDE ISD,
http://www.nisd.net/studentlocator/ (last visited May 14, 2013) (describing Texas RFID program
that tracks the location of students while at school).
15 Alabama’s Layered Approach, GCN (Oct. 17, 2008), http://gcn.com/articles/2008/10/17
/alabamas-layered-approach.aspx?page=2.
16 MONAHAN, supra note 9, at 46.
17 Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability for the Domestic
Intelligence Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1441, 1442 (2011).
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fighting and fear of a civil liberties firestorm. 18 But what it eschewed
formally, it pursued in fact.
Since 9/11, a surveillance state has been in development, 19 accomplished in part by a network of fusion centers through which government agents and private-sector representatives “collect and share” information and intelligence. 20 State- and locality-run fusion centers get
most of their funding from federal grants. 21 Their stated goal is to
detect and prevent “all hazards, all crimes, all threats.” 22 At the Washington Joint Analytical Center, for instance, analysts from the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, state police, and Boeing generate
and analyze “criminal and anti-terrorism intelligence.” 23
Congressional panels, journalists, and citizens have been told that
fusion centers raise few privacy concerns and that their information
gathering is focused and valuable. 24 Contrary to these assurances,
critics have argued that fusion centers erode civil liberties without
concomitant gains for security. 25 A recent Congressional report backs
these concerns, demonstrating that fusion centers have amounted to a
waste of resources.26
Fusion centers cast a wide and indiscriminate net. Data-mining
tools analyze a broad array of personal data culled from public- and
private-sector databases, the Internet, and public and private video
cameras. Fusion centers access specially designed data-broker databases containing dossiers on hundreds of millions of individuals, including their Social Security numbers, property records, car rentals,
credit reports, postal and shipping records, utility bills, gaming, insurance claims, social network activity, and drug- and food-store
records. 27 Some gather biometric data and utilize facial-recognition
software. 28 On-the-ground surveillance is collected, analyzed, and
shared as well. For example, the San Diego fusion center purchased
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
18 Matthew C. Waxman, Police and National Security: American Local Law Enforcement and
Counterterrorism After 9/11, 3 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 377, 405-07 (2009).
19 Many observers argue that we already live in a surveillance state. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin,
Essay, The Constitution in the National Security State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2008).
20 Citron & Pasquale, supra note 17, at 1449 (exposing fusion centers as waste of resources and
threat to civil liberties).
21 Id.
22 Id. at 1450.
23 Id. (quoting Alice Lipowicz, Boeing to Staff FBI Fusion Center, WASH. TECH. (June 1,
2007), http://washingtontechnology.com/articles/2007/06/01/boeing-to-staff-fbi-fusion-center.aspx).
24 Id. at 1443.
25 See, e.g., id. at 1443 n.5.
26 See U.S. S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, MAJORITY AND MINORITY
STAFF REPORT, FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR AND INVOLVEMENT IN STATE AND LOCAL
FUSION CENTERS (2012), available at http://cdn.govexec.com/media/gbc/docs/pdfs_edit
/100312cc1.pdf [hereinafter MAJORITY AND MINORITY STAFF REPORT].
27 Id.
28 CITRON & PASQUALE, supra note 17, at 1451.
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tiny cameras for law enforcement to attach to their shirt buttons, hats,
and water bottles. 29 Through the federal government’s “Information
Sharing Environment,” 30 information and intelligence is distributed to
public entities, including state, local, and federal agencies, and private
owners of “critical infrastructure,” such as transportation, medical, and
telecommunications infrastructure. 31
The scope of surveillance capacities continues to grow. Fusion centers and projects like Virtual Alabama may already have access to
broadband providers’ deep packet inspection (DPI) technologies,
which store and examine consumers’ online activities and communications. 32 This would provide government and private collaborators
with a window into online activities, 33 which could then be exploited
using data-mining and statistical-analysis tools capable of revealing
more about us and our lives than we are willing to share with even intimate family members. 34 More unsettling still is the potential combination of surveillance technologies with neuroanalytics to reveal, predict, and manipulate instinctual behavioral patterns of which we are
not even aware. 35
There can be no doubt that advanced surveillance technologies
such as these raise serious privacy concerns. In his article, Professor
Neil Richards offers a framework to “explain why and when surveillance is particularly dangerous and when it is not.” 36 Richards contends that surveillance of intellectual activities is particularly harmful
because it can undermine intellectual experimentation, which the First
Amendment places at the heart of political freedom. Richards also
raises concerns about governmental surveillance of benign activities
because it gives undue power to governmental actors to unfairly classify, abuse, and manipulate those who are being watched; but it is clear
that his driving concern is with intellectual privacy. We think that this
focus is too narrow.
According to Richards, due to intellectual records’ relationship to
First Amendment values, “surveillance of intellectual records — Inter–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
29
30
31
32

MAJORITY AND MINORITY STAFF REPORT, supra note 26, at 79.
INFORMATION SHARING ENVIRONMENT, http://www.ise.gov/ (last visited May 14, 2013).
Citron & Pasquale, supra note 17, at 1453 & n.68.
Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Implications of Deep Packet Inspection, in OFFICE OF
THE PRIVACY COMMISSIONER OF CANADA, DEEP PACKET INSPECTION (Mar. 2009),
available at http://www.priv.gc.ca/information/research-recherche/2009/keats-citron_200903_e.asp.
33 Id.
Paul Ohm has carefully made the case for why DPI practices storing email
communications would violate electronic surveillance laws. Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of
Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1417.
34 See, e.g., Duhigg, supra note 2.
35 See Amanda C. Pustilnik, Neutrotechnologies at the Intersection of Criminal Procedure and
Constitutional Law, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE FUTURE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN
AMERICA (John T. Parry & L. Song Richardson eds., forthcoming 2013).
36 Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1935 (2013).
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net search histories, email, web traffic, or telephone communications — is particularly harmful.” 37 Richards argues that governmental
surveillance seeking access to intellectual records should therefore be
subjected to a high threshold of demonstrated need and suspicion before it is allowed by law. 38 He argues also that individuals ought to be
able to challenge in court “surveillance of intellectual activities.” 39
Richards further proposes that “a reasonable fear of government surveillance that affects the subject’s intellectual activities (reading, thinking, and communicating) should be recognized as a harm sufficient to
prove an injury in fact under standing doctrine.” 40
Richards is right to call for the protection of “intellectual privacy.” 41 Reflecting his concerns, the U.S. Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations recently reported internal Department of Homeland Security warnings about agents routinely using fusion centers
to collect intelligence on “First Amendment-protected activities lacking
a nexus to violence or criminality,” including those of religious and political groups. 42 One fusion center instructed law enforcement to collect information on supporters of third-party candidates, including the
public movements of cars with bumper stickers supporting Ron Paul
and Bob Barr. 43 Expressing the impact of this sort of surveillance on
intellectual privacy, one political activist explained that he feared being pulled over by a police officer because of political views expressed
by his bumper sticker. 44 Although much fusion center surveillance
remains hidden, Richards’s concerns are valid and pressing; in the
present, as in the past, there can be no doubt that surveillance systems
interfere with expressive activities.
Although Richards aptly captures the dangers to intellectual freedom posed by technologically enhanced surveillance, we fear his policy
prescriptions are both too narrow and too broad because they focus on
“intellectual activities” as a necessary trigger and metric for judicial
scrutiny of surveillance technologies. 45 Our concerns run parallel to
arguments we have made elsewhere against the so-called “mosaic
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

Id. at 1962.
Id.
Id. at 1963.
Id. at 1964.
See id. at 1935.
MAJORITY AND MINORITY STAFF REPORT, supra note 26, at 36.
See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 17, at 1458; see also id. at 1458–63 (discussing the
chilling of expressive activities and risk of erroneous classification of individuals raised by fusion
centers’ surveillance of religious, political, and racial groups).
44 T.J. Greaney, ‘Fusion Center’ Data Draws Fire over Assertions, COLUMBIA DAILY TRIB.,
Mar. 14, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.columbiatribune.com/news/local/fusion-center-data
-draws-fire-over-assertions/article_b929741f-2302-5c1e-bcbd-1bc154375a8f.html.
45 Richards, supra note 36, at 1948.
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theory” of quantitative privacy 46 advanced by the D.C. Circuit 47 and
four Justices of the Supreme Court in United States v. Jones. 48 Our
argument there supports our objection here: by focusing too much on
what information is gathered rather than how it is gathered, efforts to
protect reasonable expectations of privacy threatened by new and developing surveillance technologies will disserve the legitimate interests
of both information aggregators and their subjects.
One reason we are troubled by Richards’s focus on “intellectual activities” as the primary trigger for regulating surveillance technology is
that it dooms us to contests over which kinds of conduct, experiences,
and spaces implicate intellectual engagement and which do not. 49 Is
someone’s participation in a message board devoted to video games
sufficiently intellectual to warrant protection? What about a telephone
company’s records showing that someone made twenty phone calls in
ten minutes’ time to a particular number without anyone picking up?
Would we consider the route someone took going to the library an intellectual activity? Is it the form of the activity or what is being accomplished that matters most?
Setting aside obvious practical concerns, the process of determining
which things are intellectual necessarily raises the specter of oppression. Courts and legislators would be required to select among competing conceptions of the good life, marking some “intellectual” activities as worthy of protection, while denying that protection to other
“non-intellectual” activities. Inevitable contests over the content and
scope of “intellectual privacy” will be, by their nature, subject to the
whims and emergencies of the hour. 50 In the face of terrorist threats,
decisionmakers will surely promote a narrow definition of “intellectual
privacy,” one that is capable of licensing programs like Virtual Alabama and fusion centers. Historically, decisionmakers have limited
civil liberties in times of crisis and reversed course in times of peace, 51
but the post-9/11 period shows no sign of the pendulum’s swinging
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
46 David Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter Gray & Citron, Quantitative Privacy]; David Gray & Danielle
Keats Citron, A Shattered Looking Glass: The Pitfalls and Potential of the Mosaic Theory of
Fourth Amendment Privacy, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter Gray &
Citron, Shattered Looking Glass]; David Gray, Danielle Keats Citron & Liz Clark Rinehart,
Fighting Cybercrime After United States v. Jones, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming
2013).
47 See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 565 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
48 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012); see id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
49 See Orin Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 110 MICH. L. REV. 311, 33053 (2012).
50 Citron & Pasquale, supra note 17, at 1479-80 (exploring the Schmittian “state of emergency”
exceptionalism embraced in the post-9/11 era).
51 Daniel J. Solove, Data Mining and the Security-Liberty Debate, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 343, 350
(2008).
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back. Given the nature of political and judicial decisionmaking in our
state of perpetually heightened security, protection, even of “intellectual privacy,” is most likely to be denied to the very outsiders, fringe
thinkers, and social experimenters whom Richards is most concerned
with protecting. 52
Richards might argue that his account of “intellectual privacy” and
his definition of “intellectual activities” are sufficiently capacious to
obviate these concerns. Yet this very capaciousness proves our point.
Whether “intellectual privacy” and “intellectual activities” will be read
narrowly or broadly, and for that matter, what might constitute a narrow or broad reading, inevitably will be contested just as hotly as the
borders of inclusion and exclusion. To draw a loose parallel, the debates among legal positivists and natural law theorists did not abate
when Hart expanded the descriptive scope of positivism 53 or when
Dworkin did the same for naturalism. 54 To the contrary, they simply
expanded the number of battlefronts so that we now see bloody contests within both camps as well as between them.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the weight of these sorts of
concerns in the context of Fourth Amendment debates. For example,
in Kyllo v. United States, the Court was invited to limit Fourth
Amendment protection to activities in the home that can be regarded
as “intimate.” 55 Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia demurred precisely because he thought the Court had neither the qualifications nor
the authority to determine what is and is not “intimate.” 56 He therefore focused on the invasiveness of the technology itself — a heat detection device — and its potential to render a wide range of activities
in the home, whether “intimate” or not, subject to government surveillance.57 By our lights, this is a wise path to follow. Although we find
persuasive Richards’s description of the harms inflicted by totalizing
surveillance on intellectual privacy, we are not persuaded that the law
should use “intellectual activities” as a trigger for judicial scrutiny or
as a special category for judicial treatment any more than the Court
should use “intimacy” as a signal for Fourth Amendment regulation.
Rather than assigning primary importance to “intellectual activities” and presumably providing less protection against the acknowl–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
52 These concerns — political grudges as well as crisis overreach — animated the Church
Commission’s support of FISA after the intelligence surveillance abuses of the COINTELPRO
era. Brief of Former Church Committee Members and Staff as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents and Affirmance at 13, 18, Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, No. 11-1025, 2012 WL
4480741, at *13, *18 (U.S. Feb. 26, 2013).
53 See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
54 See generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
55 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37–38 (2001).
56 See id.
57 Id.
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edged perils of broader types of surveillance, the law’s focus should be
on the dangers of totalizing surveillance. Information privacy scholars 58 and surveillance studies theorists 59 alike have long adhered to
this approach, and for good reason. Technologies like Virtual Alabama
and the fusion-center network amass, link, analyze, and share mass
quantities of information about individuals, much of which is quotidian. What is troubling about these technologies is not what information they gather, but rather the broad, indiscriminate, and continuous
nature of the surveillance they facilitate. 60 Video cameras may be
trained on street corners, drugstore aisles, or a school’s bathroom entrances. The information they gather likely does not implicate intellectual activities. They nonetheless create and sustain the kind of surveillance state that is anathema to liberty and democratic culture. 61
Fusion centers rely upon data-broker dossiers, much of which has
nothing to do with intellectual endeavors. There is no doubt, however,
that continuously streaming all of this information into the information-sharing environment facilitates the sort of broad and indiscriminate surveillance that is characteristic of a surveillance state.
In assessing the privacy interests threatened by such totalizing surveillance, we have in mind some of the lessons taught by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in their foundational article The Right to Privacy. 62 Of course, the surveillance technologies of their era could only
record discrete slices of life. Nonetheless, Warren and Brandeis recognized that emerging surveillance capacities threatened individuals’ interests in being “let alone” in their “private life, habits, acts, and relations.” 63 In Warren and Brandeis’s view, the watchful eye of “any
other modern device for recording or reproducing scenes or sounds” interfered with the development of a person’s “inviolate personality.” 64
In discussing a husband’s note to his son that he did not dine with his
wife — a pedestrian communication by any measure — Warren and
Brandeis explained that the privacy interest protected was “not the intellectual act of recording the fact that the husband did not dine with
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
58 See, e.g., JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF 141 (2012); Julie E.
Cohen, Privacy, Visibility, Transparency, and Exposure, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 181, 195 (2008).
59 See, e.g., Kevin D. Haggerty, Tear Down the Walls: On Demolishing the Panopticon, in
THEORIZING SURVEILLANCE 23 (David Lyon ed., 2006); David Lyon, From Big Brother to the
Electronic Panopticon, in THE ELECTRONIC EYE 57 (1994); Roger A. Clarke, Information
Technology and Dataveillance, 31 COMM. ACM 498 (1988).
60 Gray & Citron, Quantitative Privacy, supra note 46, at 8 & n.45. We are inspired to use this
formulation by Susan Freiwald. See Susan Freiwald, The Four Factor Test (2013) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://works.bepress.com/context/susan_freiwald/article/1012/type/native
/viewcontent.
61 See generally Gray & Citron, Quantitative Privacy, supra note 46.
62 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
63 Id. at 193, 216.
64 Id. at 205–06.
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his wife,” but the unwanted observance of the “domestic occurrence”
itself. 65 Of course, these are precisely the concerns echoed by Justice
Scalia on behalf of the Court in Kyllo. 66
The threat posed by contemporary surveillance technologies lies in
how much and how often people are watched. Modern technologies
allow observers to detect, gather, and aggregate mass quantities of data about mundane daily acts and habits as well as “intellectual” ones.67
The continuous and indiscriminate surveillance they accomplish is
damaging because it violates reasonable expectations of quantitative
privacy, by which we mean privacy interests in large aggregations of
information that are independent from particular interests in constituent parts of that whole. 68 To be sure, the harms that Richards links to
intellectual privacy are very much at stake in recognizing a right to
quantitative privacy. But rather than being a function of the kind of
information gathered, we think that the true threats to projects of selfdevelopment and democratic culture lie in the capacity of new and developing technologies to facilitate a surveillance state.
In adopting this view, we ally ourselves in part with commitments
to a quantitative account of Fourth Amendment privacy promoted by
at least five Justices of the Supreme Court last Term in United States
v. Jones. 69 In Jones, police officers investigating drug trafficking in
and around the District of Columbia attached a GPS-enabled tracking
device on defendant Jones’s car. By monitoring his movements over
the course of a month, investigators were able to document both the
patterns and the particulars of his travel, which played a critical role
in his ultimate conviction. Although the Court resolved Jones on the
narrow grounds of physical trespass, five justices wrote or joined concurring opinions showing sympathy for the proposition that citizens
hold reasonable expectations of privacy in large quantities of data,
even if they lack reasonable expectations of privacy in the constitutive
parts of that whole. 70 Thus, they would have held that Jones had a
reasonable expectation in the aggregate of data documenting his public
movements over the course of four weeks, even though he did not have
any expectation of privacy in his public movements on any particular
afternoon. 71
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
65
66

Id. at 201.
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37–38 (2001) (Fourth Amendment is concerned with
protecting sanctity of the home, not with protecting certain domestic activities over others).
67 Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1805, 1832–33
(2010).
68 See Gray & Citron, Quantitative Privacy, supra note 46.
69 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
70 Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
71 See id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
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The account of quantitative privacy advanced by the Jones concurrences has much in common with the views promoted by Warren and
Brandeis. Specifically, the concurring Justices in Jones expressed worry that by “making available at a relatively low cost such a substantial
quantum of intimate information about any person whom the Government, in its unfettered discretion, chooses to track,” programs of
broad and indiscriminate surveillance will “chill[] associational and
expressive freedoms,” and “alter the relationship between citizen and
72
government in a way that is inimical to a democratic society.” Their
concerns are well-grounded in original understandings of the Fourth
Amendment. 73 As Professor William Stuntz has shown, the Fourth
Amendment was drafted partly in reaction to eighteenth-century cases
involving the British government’s use of general warrants to seize
personal diaries and letters in support of seditious-libel prosecutions
that were designed to suppress political thought. 74 Despite these roots,
quantitative privacy is just beginning to receive recognition because it
is only now under threat of extinction by technologies like Virtual Alabama and fusion centers.
There are two ways we might seek to protect quantitative privacy
in an age of expanding surveillance technology. One strategy would
focus on the aggregations of information assembled with respect to a
particular person. This “mosaic” approach presents serious practical
concerns along the lines we described with regard to intellectual privacy. 75 As Professor Orin Kerr asks, where would we draw the line between aggregations that are and are not too invasive? 76 How would
we treat discrete aggregations assembled by different actors if the sum
of those wholes would cross the invasiveness threshold, wherever it is
drawn? 77 More importantly, we do not see how this approach could
actually preserve reasonable expectations of quantitative privacy. The
harm is done, after all, by being watched in a totalizing way — or by
the awareness that one might be so watched. 78 Limiting the scope of
information dossiers does little to address those concerns. In light of
these challenges, we have argued elsewhere for regulating the technologies themselves. 79 Our arguments there strongly suggest that Ri–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
72
73
74

Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
See generally Gray & Citron, Quantitative Privacy, supra note 46.
William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 394
(1995).
75 For an extended discussion of the mosaic theory, see Gray & Citron, Shattered Looking
Glass, supra note 46.
76 Kerr, supra note 44, at 333–36.
77 Id.
78 See generally Gray & Citron, Shattered Looking Glass, supra note 46.
79 Gray & Citron, Quantitative Privacy, supra note 46.
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chards’s goal of protecting intellectual privacy would also be better
served by adopting a technology-centered approach.
Of course, none of this argument is intended to discount the benefits of surveillance to national security, criminal justice, emergency response, public administration, or medical care. 80 As Richards observes, any account of surveillance’s privacy harms is often resisted on
the grounds that some surveillance is essential for the public good.
But there is a line between surveillance that is essential for the public
good and invasive total-information awareness technologies, and that
line is easy to cross if unattended. This leaves us with the question of
how to protect society from the gradual acceptance and institutionalization of total-information awareness technologies. Richards supports
allowing individuals to challenge surveillance of intellectual activities
in court as a cognizable harm. Here again, we worry that his proposal
is unlikely to preserve the fundamental interests at stake.
Richards proposes to grant individuals standing to challenge governmental surveillance. 81 Putting concerns about the constitutionality of such a challenge aside, his proposal may raise practical problems.
Granting individuals standing to challenge governmental surveillance
of them would overwhelm the courts. There are not enough judicial
resources to adjudicate three hundred million such suits, each of which
could be renewed — almost as soon as it is resolved — on nothing
more than suspicion of continued surveillance because the focus, under
Richards’s approach, is on what information is being gathered. The
possibility of a class action would not help matters because individual
issues of harm attached to what particular information is gathered
would predominate. 82 Suits are also bound to be met with claims of
national security interest, to which courts routinely show considerable
deference. 83 For example, in litigation involving police surveillance of
protestors at the 2004 Republican National Convention, the Second
Circuit refused to allow discovery of officers’ field reports, even in redacted form, because they would reveal information about undercover
operations and thus potentially hinder future ones. 84
What is more, lawsuits designed to uncover surveillance of intellectual activities may be unable to identify the “intellectual records” gathered by government due to the way certain surveillance systems op–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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Court’s recent decision in Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, No. 11-1025, 2013 WL 673253 (U.S. Feb.
26, 2013).
82 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
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erate. Fusion centers, for instance, may access and analyze private
and public databases and real-time video feeds without ever creating
and storing records. Although fusion center surveillance of all individuals’ on and offline activities is continuous and totalizing, it does
not necessarily produce records that could be packaged and produced
as part of a discovery process. Ultimately, the vastness of contemporary governmental total-information awareness renders the judiciary
incapable of reviewing the majority of situations on an individual basis. Furthermore, any individual cases that made it to judgment could
no more chip away at discrete instances of governmental surveillance.
Because they would focus on the intellectual privacy interests of specific litigants, these cases would not and could not challenge the system of totalizing surveillance as a whole.
Here again, we think that a technology-centered approach that
seeks to protect quantitative privacy is far more promising. Not only
would it avoid the constitutional and practical challenges of individual
litigation based on the trigger and metric of intellectual privacy, a focus on the technology would also open the door to a wide range of alternative regulatory frameworks that could more efficiently and reliably strike a reasonable compromise between the legitimate interests of
government and the privacy interests of citizens. 85 For example, an
independent board of experts, such as the Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board (PCLOB), could perform an analysis of the privacy
and civil liberties risks posed by surveillance technologies. 86 PCLOB,
now fully staffed, 87 could mandate safeguards for the use of surveillance technologies that raise the specter of a surveillance state and
make recommendations based on their privileged access to security
analyses, piercing the veil secrecy that Richards laments. 88 Board
members, vetted for top-secret national security clearances, could attain a comprehensive view of domestic surveillance technologies that
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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would enable them to recommend procedural protections for quantitative privacy to prevent governmental abuse. 89 Such procedural protections would by nature protect the intellectual privacy interests at
the heart of Richards’s proposal without the drawbacks of using intellectual privacy as a trigger and metric of action.
Although we live in a world of total surveillance, we need not accept its dangers — at least not without a fight. As Richards rightly
warns, unconstrained surveillance can be profoundly harmful to intellectual privacy. It would be wrong, however, to conflate symptom and
cure. What is most concerning, for us is the rapid adoption of technologies that increasingly facilitate persistent, continuous, and indiscriminate monitoring of our daily lives. Although harms to intellectual privacy are certainly central to our understanding of the interests at
stake, it is this specter of a surveillance state that we think ought to be
the center of judicial, legislative, and administrative solutions, not the
particular intellectual privacy interests of individuals.
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89 Id. at 1473.
For instance, they could require immutable audit logs that promote
governmental interest in national security with a commitment to “watch the watchers” by
recording all of the uses of that technology.

